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Abstract 
To improve the livelihood of the poor in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) much attention has been paid to the 
development of new agricultural technologies. We hypothesize that farmers can also improve their livelihood 
through cooperation. Partial cooperation, in which knowledge is shared or bargaining power improved, is 
relatively common in SSA, while cooperation where all resources are fully shared, which we address, has rarely 
been investigated. An important pre-requisite to establish such cooperation, is the need for a fair division rule for 
the gains of the cooperation. This paper combines linear programming and cooperative game theory to model the 
effects of cooperation of (individual) households on income and farm plans. Linear programming establishes 
insight in the optimal farm plans in cooperation, and cooperative game theory is used to generate fair division 
rules. The model is applied to a village in Northern Nigeria. Households are clustered based on socio-economic 
parameters, and we explore cooperation between clusters. Cooperation leads to increased income and results in 
changes in farm plans, because more efficient use of resources leads to more intensified agriculture (labour 
intensive – high value crops). 
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Introduction 
In this paper we consider cooperation of farmers in a 
village in which physical resources are fully shared. In 
practice, this means that all land, labour and capital are 
shared and decisions are made based on the aggregated 
resources. Individual farmer decisions are frequently 
analysed with the use of linear programming (LP) 
models, firstly introduced by King (1953) and Heady 
(1954). The basic LP model describes the most 
important decisions of the farm households, namely 
production, market and consumption decisions. The 
constraints are based on the major input-factors used 
in farming: land, labour, and capital. The solution of 
the LP model leads to an optimal farm plan 
corresponding with the optimal objective function. The 
LP approach can also be used for modelling the 
decisions of a cooperation, with the only difference 
that the resources are aggregated for several farmers. 
As resources do differ among farmers, resources of 
different farmers may complement each other, and 
cooperation possibly leads to more efficient use of the 
resources and to different farm plans with extra gains. 
Indeed, if cooperation yields extra gains, another 
problem arises: in which way should these extra gains 
be divided among the involved farmers.  
The innovation of this paper is that LP and cooperative 
game theory are combined to model the effects of 
cooperation of (individual) households on income and 
farm plans. Owen (1975) developed LP games, a 
special class of cooperative games in which LP and 
cooperative game theory are combined. By 
constructing a suitable LP model for farm planning 
and developing an associated LP game we are able to 
analyse the attractiveness of cooperation and the 
changes in farm plan decisions. Moreover, a game 
theoretical division rule is considered. Our LP model 
is based on the basic farm household model as 
described in Schweigman (1985). 
A case study from Northern Nigeria is used to 
illustrate the model. This paper is organised as 
follows. After the introduction, we describe the model 
and data in Section 2. Thereafter, in Section 3, we 
discuss the results of the applied model, and a 
conclusion appears in Section 4. 
Materials and Methods 
First, we developed an LP model based on a basic 
farm household model as described in Schweigman 
(1985). The decision variables reflect the  production, 
consumption and market decisions of a farmer. A Game Theoretic Approach to Analyse Cooperation between Rural Households in Northern Nigeria 
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Production decisions are twofold. The farmer needs to 
decide which crops to be cultivated and needs to make 
a choice of a cropping system to cultivate the crop. 
Other decisions include decisions on hiring (out) 
labour and taking or paying off a loan.  
As objective function we use the maximisation of 
gross margin of crop production. From the basic farm 
household model (Schweigman (1985)) we 
incorporated the monthly constraints for labour supply, 
storage balances, capital and loan balances and 
production levels of crops.  
Furthermore, the basic constraint for the total area 
used by the farmer is included. To make the model 
specific for the region, we include restrictions for both 
land use of common farm area and use of fadama area 
(low lands) for growing crops with high demand on 
water such as rice, sugarcane, etc. Furthermore, a 
subsistence constraint is included about the nutritional 
needs on energy and protein of households. Moreover, 
a constraint is included for the maximum loan which 
can be taken during the year. Finally, a constraint is 
incorporated to set a maximum to the total amount of 
time the farmer is able to work on other farms to earn 
additional income against the local wage rate 
 
 
Second, we used the LP model to explore the changes 
in farm plans by comparing the optimal farm plan of 
the grand coalition with the (sum of the) farm plans of 
the individuals. Third, we introduced the linear 
production (LP) game (see Owen (1985), by using the 
above described LP model. We assume that the 
production matrix is the same for everybody in the 
village, in line with the assumption of local 
homogeneity in production technologies. This 
assumption is justified as prices, yields and required 
inputs do not differ among farmers in the same village 
while available resources can be different for each 
farmer. After construction of the LP game, the gain of 
the cooperation should be divided among the farmers. 
We opted to use the Owen-value (Owen (1985)), 
which is a division rule especially developed for LP 
games.  
The model is applied to farmers in Ikuzeh village, 
Kajuru Local Government Area, Kaduna State, 
Nigeria. This village is located in the Northern Guinea 
Savannah (NGS). This agroecological zone is defined 
by a length of growing period of 151-180 days and 
unimodal rainfall pattern. Hausa is the major ethnic 
group. Main crops include sorghum, maize, and 
cowpea for the upland fields. In the lowlands, 
sugarcane and rice are cultivated in the village. Crop 






Table 1. Characteristics of the five clusters 
  Cluster  A  B C D E 
Number  of  farmers  23  8 4 2 2 
Farmsize (hectare)
 a b  4,72  6,45  18,07 13,70 6,05 
Fadama (hectare) 
a b  0,45 0,72 1,96 2,23 0,52 
Household size (# persons)
 a  6.2  14.6 11.5 11.0 6.0 
Ownership Livestock (TLU)
 a  0.5 1.7 0.9 5.7 3.2 
Value of stated Assets (Naira)
 a  2900 5700 3000 2600 53700 
Labour (Man hours month)
b  570 980 885 1104  561 
Outgoing Labour (Manhours /month)
b* 57  98  88.5  110.4  56.1 
Energy required (MJ) 
b  1484 2402 2778 2957 1560 
Protein required (g)
 b  5664  9189  10428 11235 5898 
Maximum Loan (Naira)
 b*  0  2850 2850 5700 5700 
a cluster variable,
 b resource parameter in the LP model; *(rough) estimations of the researchers Gerichhausen, M. et al. 
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from a baseline survey carried out in 2002 on a sample 
of 39 farmers (De Haan (2002). Prices are estimated 
based on data from the Kaduna State Agricultural 
Development Program (KADP (2002) and Kaduna 
State Fertilizer Company (KSFC  (2002). 
Wage rates and detailed labour input requirements are 
based on biweekly surveys in the region in  2005 
(Berkhout (2005)). From FAO (2007) we obtained the 
food energy and protein contained in each crop. For 
the estimation of the resource parameters, which are 
different for each farm household, we use the data on 
the 39 different farmers from the same 2002 baseline 
survey. We used cluster analysis to classify farmers 
into five homogeneous groups (Hazell and Norton, 
1986). The 39 households were clustered using data on 
farm size, area for fadama, household size, livestock 
ownership, and household stated assets such as radio, 
bicycle, tools etc. Based on the results of the 
hierarchical cluster analysis the 39 farmers are 
grouped into five clusters. 
We calculate the average resources in each cluster, 
such that five average farmers can be constructed. We 
will analyse the attractiveness of cooperation between 
the five average farmers. In Table I the average 
characteristics of the five clusters are presented. We  
show cluster variables, as well as the farm specific 
resource parameters which are used in the model, i.e., 
farm and fadama size, labour availability, energy and 
protein requirements and loan availabilities.  
Results and Discussion 
In Figure I we present the optimal farm plans of the 
individuals, the sum of the individuals and the 
cooperation, by solving the corresponding LP models. 
The results show that farmers C and D do not cultivate 
their complete farms, which is probably due to their 
large available farms (see Table I) and the lack of 
resources to cultivate all available land. For all 
individual farmers together, there is cultivation of 24 
% fallow land, while in cooperation the fallow land 
will reduce to 17 % and fields with sorghum-cowpea 
relay and sugarcane are expanded. 
In cooperation, one expects to find an improvement in 
gross margin; therefore we compared the results of the 
individuals and those of the cooperation. In Table II 
we show the resources and corresponding gross 


























 Figure:  1.  Optimal relative farm plans for individuals and cooperation  
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The gross margin of all individuals (A+B+C+D+E) is 
equal to 2.394.258 Naira, which is lower than the 
gross margin of the cooperation, which is 2.685.004 
Naira. Hence cooperation leads to a substantial 
improvement in benefits. 
Now the corresponding LP game (Owen (1985)) can 
be introduced in this setting. We considered 
N={A,B,C,D,E} as the set of players and using the LP 
model and the data of Section 2. In Table III the 
complete LP-game (N,v) is presented. For each 
coalition S (defined as a cooperation between certain  
farmers), the resources of the coalition are calculated 
and based on this we solve the LP model for the 
coalition. The resulting gross margin is reflected by 
v(S) in the game. Consecutively, in Table IV we 
compare for each farmer the individual gross margin 
and its Owen value. The Owen value is a fair division 
of the grand coalition, N, that arises in a natural way 
from the LP game (cf. Owen (1975)). To calculate the 
Owen value, the shadow prices of the LP model of the 






Table 3. Game for gross margin maximization 
S V(S)  S  V(S)  S  v(S) S  v(S)  S  V(S) 
A 271099  AB 667173  ABC  1507522  ABCD  2351735  N  2685004 
B 396074  AC 954334  ABD  1625392  ABCE  1835246     
C 604609  AD 1137887  ABE  999496  ABDE  1955472     
D 800591  AE  600965  ACD  1754925  ACDE  2166980     
E 321885  BC 1212479  ACE  1328126  BCDE  2388637     
   BD  1349520  ADE 1471518         
   BE  728397  BCD 2050770         
   CD  1405200  BCE 1541344         
   CE  1029093  BDE 1679716         
   DE  1173810  CDE 1866015         
Table 2. Gross margin for individuals, the sum of individuals and the grand coalition 











Farm  4,72 6,45 18,07  13,70  6,05 48,99  48,99 
Fadama  0,45 0,72 1,96 2,23 0,52 5,88 5,88 







410  Outgoing  Labour 57 98 88,5 
Energy  1484 2402 2778 2957 1560 11181  11181 
Protein  5664 9189 10428  11235  5898 42414  42414 
Loan  (Naira)  0  2850 2850 5700 5700 17100  17100 
 Gross  Margin  (Naira)
* 271099 396074 604609 800591 321885 2394258  2685004 
* Exchange rate: 1 USD= 133 Naira (at December 2006) 
Table 4. Owen value (Naira) compared with individual gross margin  
  Individual  Owen Value  Increase  Increase % 
A 271099  294064  22965  8% 
B 396074  507686  111613  28% 
C 604609  705772  101163  17% 
D 800591  849192  48601  6% 
E 321885  328290  6406  2% Gerichhausen, M. et al. 
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The results show that especially farmers B and C gain 
a lot with cooperation, as we expected from the 
patterns of the cropping systems (Fig. 1). Those 
improvements can be explained with the shadow 
prices (not shown). Farmer B has 150 man hours per 
hectare (= 980/6.45) on labour available, which is the 
highest among all farmers. For his individual farm 
plan the labour shadow price is zero, and not all of this 
resource is used, while in the grand coalition the 
labour has a high value. The improvement of farmer C 
is mainly due to the high shadow price of fadama 
fields and the fact that C owns relatively many fadama 
fields. Furthermore, farmer E has a small increase in 
the gross margin of 2% only, which means that in his 
individual plan, the resources are (almost fully) and 
efficiently used. 
Conclusion 
Findings from this paper clearly gave evidence that 
cooperation of farmers should be stimulated, because 
extra gains can be obtained. Moreover, cooperation 
has more potentials to develop and to be stable if fair 
division rules can be provided. The Owen value shows 
to have this property, because it divides exactly the 
gain that is obtained when all farmers cooperate and 
each individual farmer receives more than the case in 
which he is not cooperating. 
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